El 22 de enero de este año El Universal reportó que los negocios de Bielorrusia con Venezuela en la construcción de viviendas estaban plagados de corrupción. El mismo Presidente Lukashenko así lo admitió y dijo que se estaban investigando a empresarios tales como Viktor Shevtsov en relación con estos hechos.
Chávez ha firmado contratos de manera indiscriminada con países extranjeros para construír viviendas sin que nadie sepa dinde fue a parar el dinero involucrado. Se han firmado contratos multimillonarios con Irán (2006), Uruguay (2008), Bielorrusia (2008), Turquía (2011), Ecuador (2011), España, repetidas cartas de intención con China (2010, 2011) y de un nuevo contrato con Irán (2011).
Deseo ilustrar la pudrición de la Misión Vivienda con el ejemplo del primer "contrato" firmado con Irán. Este "contrato" fue suscrito por Chávez con empresas iraníes en 2006 para construír 10.000 viviendas en Guárico, Portuguesa, Cojedes y Monagas, a un costo que no hemos logrado encontrar en ninguna parte. Ha sido descrito como "el mayor jamás firmado por Irán y uno de los mayores del mundo en el sector de la construcción". Las casas debían ser construídas en 36 meses, por lo cual han debido terminarse y ser entregadas en el año 2009. Donde están esas casas? Fueron terminadas? Fueron entregadas a los venezolanos? A quienes? Se cumplió el contrato? Es preciso hacer estas preguntas porque se sabe muy poco sobre las empresas con las cuales se firmaron los contratos. La información que poseo habla de tres empresas consultoras iraníes: (1), Ingenieros Consultores y Consultores arquitectonicos y civiles del Grupo de Ingeniería Sanati; ; (2), Compañía Tadbir Sahel Pars, y, (3), Consultor de Instalaciones Eléctricas y Mecánicas- Compañía Tavan Tak. La empresa constructora se llama Kayson, es iraní y tiene estrecha relación con Bielorrusia. Todas sus referencias son del gobierno de Ahmadinejad. Su website dice que, "por no tener trabajo suficiente en Irán", se ha especializado en proyectos en el tercer mundo, sobretodo en Venezuela, en Bielorrusia y en la India. Está listada como "sospechosa" por Gran Bretaña y USA en actividades relacionadas con el sector militar iraní. (http://www.iranwatch.org/suspect/records/kayson-company.html ). Cuando uno va a buscar información sobre las empresas asesoras en Internet se encuentra con lo siguiente: En el caso de la empresa Tadbir Sahel Pars Consulting Engineering, no se describen actividades, ni tiene productos. La dirección no se especifica. Tiene un Teléfono: 0214404165 y un website: http://www.tadbirsahel.com pero al abrirlo no tiene contenido. La empresa Tavan Tak Jam Co. muestra el teléfono 98-262-3262770. Tiene un Website: http://www.tavantak.com. Pero, al abrir el sitio, se observa que no guarda relación alguna con la empresa. Para el Grupo de Ingeniería Senati o Sanati no hemos logrado encontrar información en Internet.
Que credibilidad podemos asignarle a este contrato gigantesco para 10.000 viviendas si las empresas asesoras parecen fantasmas y la empresa constructora está bajo investigación en Occidente por sus nexos con Ahamdinejad?
En Julio 2011, (AFP), se firmó un nuevo contrato con el Irán para "construír" otras 10.000 casas, a un costo de más de mil millones de dólares. Las casas serían contruídas en Carabobo, Yaracuy y Lara. El monto del contrato significa que cada casita costaría alrededor de cien mil dólares. No sabemos con quien es el contrato. Será con los mismos asesores ectoplásmicos de antes? Y si ello es así, donde están las casas del primer contrato, las que han debido estar listas hace más de dos años?
Las viviendas de Chávez no existen
La verdad es que Hugo Chávez apenas ha construído la tercera parte de las viviendas que los presidentes de la democracia construyeron. En efecto, Herrera construyó 360.589 casas en cinco años. Lusinchi 331.665 en cinco años. CAP II/Velazquez 305.425 en cinco años y Caldera II 341.666 en cinco años. Chávez ha construído 385.729 en catorce años!
Chávez ha implantado seis planes de viviendas, todos muy desorganizados:
Plan Avispa del Plan Bolívar 2000 (2000)
Misión Hábitat (2004)
Misión Villanueva (2006)
Misión 13 de Abril (2008)
Misión Barrio Tricolor (2009)
Gran Misión Vivienda (2011)
La Gran Misión Vivienda (?) tiene 1.200.000 familias registradas esperando vivienda. El deficit habitacional en el país se estima hoy en dos millones de viviendas.
Las viviendas se están construyendo…. en otros países
Mientras el desórden, la corrupción y el fraude proliferan en Venezuela, en el exterior Chávez ha pagado por unas 200.000 casas. En Cuba, Bolivia, Perú, Nicaragua, República Dominicana y hasta en algunos países africanos, Chávez ha donado o construído casas.
Gustavo Coronel
Standard and Poor's gives PDVSA a very generous rating
S&P released its assessment of PDVSA yesterday, Monday July 30, 2012.
PDVSA's rating by S&P is B+, somewhere between B and BB. The definitions for these ratings are:
'BB'— Less vulnerable in the near-term but faces major ongoing uncertainties to adverse business, financial and economic conditions.
'B'— More vulnerable to adverse business, financial and economic conditions but currently has the capacity to meet financial commitments.
I believe the rating of S&P is extremely generous since it ignores some of the operational and financial difficulties the company has.
I have made some comments to the report, which is partly transcribed below (see link at the end of this note, if you wish to read the entire report by S&P) :
Overview
-- Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA's business and financial
performance remain aligned with our expectation.
-- We are affirming our 'B+' rating on PDVSA.
-- The stable outlook reflects our view that PDVSA's relationship with
the government will not change significantly over the next few years.
My Comment: PDVSA's relationship with the government could change dramatically in the next few months. S&P is predicting a Chavez's victory but this prediction could be very wrong. A more professional appraisal would have at least considered another scenario to the one linearly predicted by S&P.
Rating Action
On July 30, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its 'B+'
long-term corporate credit and senior unsecured ratings on Petroleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). The outlook is stable. This affirmation follows our
regular annual review.
Rationale
The 'B+' rating on PDVSA, which is at the same level as that on its owner, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (B+/Stable/B), reflects our opinion that
there is an "almost certain" likelihood that the government would provide
timely and sufficient extraordinary support to PDVSA in the event of a
financial distress.
My Comment: I find this opinion extremely fragile. It says the Venezuelan government would provide timely and extraordinary support to PDVSA in the event of a financial distress. But the reality is different. It is PDVSA that is supporting the government and, in fact, being mercilessly used by the central government as a vehicle for progressive national debt. The Venezuelan government does not have the financial capability to rescue PDVSA in a crisis.
We assess PDVSA's stand-alone credit profile (SACP) at
'b+', which reflects our assessment of a fair business risk profile and an
aggressive financial profile. It also incorporates continued delays in
releasing its financial information, as well as our view that the company
could prioritize transfers to the government before debt payments in a
distressed scenario.
My comments: PDVSA has been diverting the money required for its investments and maintenance to the central government. Not only are they late in presenting their financial information, they are also late in paying debtors. No mention is made by S&P of the avalanche of legal actions against PDVSA in international organizations. No mention is made of the increasing debt profile of the company and of the diminishing export levels due to domestic consumption. They are now resorting to asking foreign partners for money.
In accordance with our criteria for government-related entities, our view of
an "almost certain" likelihood of extraordinary support is based on our
assessment of the following factors:
-- "Critical" role in contributing about 50% of the government's revenues
and 90% of the country's exports, and playing a key position in meeting the
sovereign's political and economic objectives; and
-- "Integral" link with the government, given its full and stable
ownership of the company. We also believe that the government will provide
considerable and timely credit support to the company in all circumstances.
My comments: Again, it is not so much a matter of wishing to do it but, rather, a matter of being able to do it. PDVSA's credit rating is much higher than the government's. PDVSA can probably bail the government out, not the other way around.
PDVSA's fair business risk profile is based on its position as a leading
integrated oil company with a considerable proven reserve base, low discovery
and development costs, and its ownership of CITGO Petroleum Corp.
(BB-/Stable/--),one of the leading refiners in the U.S. We expect PDVSA's
business strategy to continue focusing on developing Venezuela's hydrocarbon
resources and improving its refineries. The company adjusted its projected
capital expenditures to $142 billion for the next five years to achieve a
sustainable crude oil production of 4.5 million barrels per day (mbpd) by 2015.
My comments:S&P says that PDVSA will "continue developing hydrocarbon resources and improving its refineries". This is a wrong statement. They have not been doing this at all. The production has fallen off significantly as compared to the one before Chavez and has remained, at best, stagnant during the last two to three years. A projected capital expenditure of $28 billion per year is totally unrealistic, as the average investment of PDVSA in the petroleum sector during the last years has been around $10 billion A production of 4.5 million barrels per day by 2015 is science fiction. At least S&P should have seen these numbers with a more critical eye. They swallowed them whole, hook, line and sinker.
During 2011, PDVSA's crude oil production averaged 2.991 mbpd, up 1% from
2.975 mbpd in 2010 to meet OPEC production quota for that year. Current OPEC
quota for Venezuela is 3.2 mbpd. We believe that oil production will slightly
increase further and reach 3.5 mbpd for the next few years, although the
company's expectation is to increase its total production to 4.5 mbpd in 2015.
My comments: PDVSA's oil production (different from national total production, which includes foreign partners prouction) is much lower than the figure readily accepted by S&P. The president of the company, Rafael Ramirez, in a memo to Chavez leaked to the public admitted that it was in the order of 2.6 million barrels per day. Independent observers put it at even less.
Those wishing to read the whole report can do so by entering:
http://settysoutham.wordpress.com/2012/07/30/sp-expects-venezuela-oil-output-to-jump-in-
Enviado desde mi BlackBerry de Movistar
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